This study examines the impact of managerial risk-taking attitudes on firm's debt seniority policies. Following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) we viewed higher value of the sensitivity to stock return volatility in managerial compensation (Vega) as indication of managers' tendency to adopt a riskier policy choice. Using sample of US equity REITs during 2001-2009, we found a positive relation between secured debt ratio and Vega implying that risk-taking managers tend to use more secured debt in their capital structure. There are two plausible explanations for this observation. "Free cash flow hypothesis" posits that high risk-taking managers use more secured debt with purpose to generate more free cash flow to finance their risky projects. "Contracting cost hypothesis" on the other hand argues that increased secured debt helps attenuate the agency cost between shareholders and creditors arising from higher managerial risk-taking incentives.
I. Introduction
The use of equity-based executive compensation, such as stock and option, has widely increased for the past few decades (Murphy, 1999) . The effects of managerial compensation incentives on financing and investment policies have been evaluated and divided into two aspects. One is the managerial wealth sensitivities to stock price (Delta), which aligns risk-averse and undiversified managers' interests with shareholders. The other is managerial wealth sensitivities to stock return volatilities (Vega), which encourages managers to take riskier investment and financing policies (Core & Guay, 2002) . There is a growing body of literature focusing on how corporate policies could be influenced by managerial compensation incentives such as corporate capital structure, debt maturity, corporate liquidity policy (Cohen et al., 2000; Coles et al., 2006; Brockman et al., 2010) . But to our knowledge, very few studies have examined how debt seniority policy is affected by managerial risk-taking incentive. Jensen & Mecking (1976) have found that equity-based compensation, especially stock options, could provide incentives to managers to adopt risky corporate policies. Coles et al. (2006) argue that managerial equity-based compensation provides executive an incentive to invest in riskier assets and obtain more aggressive debt policies with more flexibility and fewer collaterals. Therefore, we expect managerial risk-taking incentive (Vega) would be inversely related to secured debt ratio (the portion of secured debt in total debt).
But on the other hand, literature also suggests the positive relation between managerial risk-taking incentives (Vega) and secured debt ratio. First, Berkovitch & Kim (1990) document that debt with pledged assets could induce overinvestment problem when firms obtain lower cost of debt by debt with collaterals. Firms with managerial risk-taking incentives could generate extra cash flow to finance risky projects. Therefore, shareholders benefit from the risky investment with lower cost of debt, and firms with high Vega would prefer to use more secured debt.
Second, managerial risk-taking incentive would exacerbate the interest conflicts between shareholders and creditors. Managers with risk-taking incentives may jeopardize creditors' benefits by substituting the less risky assets into risky ones.
Creditors, therefore, will require protection and firms with high risk incentives probably have to increase the amount of secured debt to alleviate the intensified agency problem between shareholders and creditors. As suggested by Barclay & Smith (1995) , Brockman et al. (2010) and Billett et al. (2010) , firms with more severe managerial incentive problems would obtain a greater amount secured debt as a big portion of liabilities in senior claims to overcome the asset substitution problem. Thus, we can also expect the positive relation between risk-taking incentive (Vega) and secured debt ratio.
Taken together, these different theoretical predictions and perspectives on how managerial incentives affect secured debt ratio suggest that debt security policy can serve as an interesting and useful topic on how managerial incentives affect shareholders, creditors and their relations. In this paper, we examine how managerial risk-taking incentives affect secured debt and what force drives this effect. REIT industry provides a better test bed for this relation, because on the one hand, REITs possess quite a few properties as their assets and they are easy to collateralize, on the other hand, agency problem is still severe although RETIs are well structured and much more transparent than other industries.
We study the causal link between managerial risk-taking incentive and corporate secured debt using a sample of 360 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2009. We employ the ratio of secured debt compared with total debt as dependent variables. For incentive variables, we follow Core & Guay (2002) method to estimate the managerial wealth sensitivities. To find out the influence of managerial incentives on secured debt usage in REITs, we apply several empirical methodologies (e.g. Random effect, 2SLS estimation and Change-in-variable regressions). As hypothesized, we find the positive relation between executive (Vega) and secured debt ratio. And in addition, we empirically test the two possible explanations regarding this positive relation by examining the wealth effect of secured debt ratio change. Taken together, these findings suggest that secured debt ratio is positively correlated with managerial risk-taking incentives in REIT industry. Firms which higher risk-taking managerial incentives would like to use more secured debt to mitigate the increased agency cost between shareholders and creditors arising from managerial risk-increasing incentives.
Our results are robust for controlling for executive risk-decreasing incentives (Delta) and cash compensation, CEO tenure, firm size and growth opportunities, leverage and debt maturity, credit rating and other firm characteristics.
Our study could make a few contributions to the existing literature. First, the main finding of this work is that secured debt could alleviate the asset substitution problem arising from managerial risk-taking incentives. This finding provides empirical support for two theories, on the one hand, Jensen & Meckling (1976) argue managerial incentive represented by equity-based compensation could exacerbate the interest conflicts between shareholders and creditors, on the other hand, Barclay & Smith (1995) assert that debt covenants such as shorter debt maturity and more secured debt could alleviate asset substitution problem between shareholders and creditors. Related work by Brockman et al. (2010) find that debt maturity could mitigate agency cost associated with asset substitution for high executive risk-taking preference. Our finding fills the gap by showing that secured debt could also mitigate the interest conflicts between shareholders and creditors arising from managerial risk-taking incentives.
Our empirical findings also add to the literature on corporate debt security policy. Leeth & Scott (1989) and Barclay & Smith (1995) find that secured debt is determined by firm characteristics such as firm size, debt maturity, growth opportunity. Ooi (2001) provides the evidence that managerial ownership would affect secured debt issuance. Our work extends the literature by pointing out that executive compensation incentive is an additional determinant of corporate debt security policy.
In addition, we expand the understanding of managerial compensation incentives on corporate capital structure. Novaes & Zingales (1995) indicate that entrenched managers would have different optimal leverage choices compared with shareholders. Cohen et al. (2000) and Coles et al. (2006) document that firms with higher risk-taking incentives implement high leverage. Brockman et al. (2010) suggest risk-taking incentives would reduce debt maturity. Hart & Moore (1993) argue that self-interested managers would prefer fewer amount of senior (secured) debt that will limit their ability to raise new fund. Our study could exhibit new evidence that managerial risk-taking incentive would increase secured debt ratio.
Our study sheds light on creditors' evaluation of the influence of managerial risk-taking incentive on secured debt. As suggested by Brockman et al. (2010) and Brillet et al. (2010) , creditors will fully consider the risk-shifting and asset substitution problems arising from managerial incentive, rationally evaluate them, and request compensation because of them.
In term of methodology, we examine wealth effect of secured debt ratio change to find out how the agency cost changes with executive compensation incentives. We follow the method used by Faulkender & Wang (2006) and Lin et al. (2010) , to compute excess return as dependent variable, and interaction between secured debt ratio change and executive risk-taking incentive as independent variable. The unique feature of this study is to construct the unique REITs benchmark portfolio in order to compute the excess return whereas previous studies use the existing databases.
This study proceeds as follows. In Section II, we review the related literature and develop our hypotheses. Section III shows our data source, sample selection and summary statistics. In Section IV, we exhibit our empirical methods and results.
Finally, we summarize our findings in Section V.
II. Related research and Hypotheses

A. Related Research
A growing body of literature focuses on the analysis of the effect of managerial incentive on corporate financial policies. DeFusco et al. (1990) argue that firms with granted stock option plan from 1978 to 1982 induce the increase in stock return variance. Mehran (1995) , Tufano (1996) , Berger et al. (1997) , and Schrand & Unal (1998) That is how much the manager could gain or lose in dollar with one percent change of firm stock price. High Delta suggests that managers are motivated by shareholders to make efforts to increase shareholder's wealth. Manager with high Delta would probably prefer to take less risk when they make financial decisions. And Delta is considered as a proxy of managerial risk-decreasing incentive.
Vega measures the sensitivity of managers' wealth to stock price volatility. That means taking more risk which induces increase of stock price volatility would benefit managers. Therefore, Vega is used as risk-increasing managerial incentive. managerial risk preference through Vega (Delta) and short-maturity debt. These papers exhibit the evidences that CEO's risk-taking incentives distort bondholder's wealth in order to enhance shareholder's benefits and firm value. Therefore, bondholders react negatively to CEO risk-taking equity compensation (Vega), and also the cost of debt raises along with managerial risk-increasing incentives. In addition, firms with higher CEO risk-taking equity compensation incentives could adjust their debt structure, for example, adopting shorter debt maturity, as a solution to the exacerbated agency problem between shareholders and bondholders.
Therefore, the influence of managerial compensation incentive on debt structure probably has two aspects. One is how firms adjust their debt structure due to managerial incentives change as shareholders' desire. The other is how firms alter their debt structure when managerial incentive changes place a load on the relation between shareholders and bondholders. There are a few key studies regarding secured debt in corporate finance literature.
Theoretically, Stulz & Johnson (1985) argue that issuing secured debt allows firms to undertake some projects that would have to be rejected if financed by equity or other types of debt. Smith & Warner (1979) contend that including higher seniority provisions in the contract could limit the firm's ability to engage in asset substitution. Leeth & Scott (1989) explain the widespread use of secured debt among the small business community in the US. They find that the incidence of secured debt is positively related with asset marketability, loan default probability, and loan maturity and size. This study also indicates the significance of collateral in reducing the costs of borrowing. Berkovitch & Kim (1990) shows that the issuance of secured debt can decrease underinvestment, but increase overinvestment by generating free cash flow. Barclay & Smith (1995) examine the priority structure of corporate liabilities among US industrial firms. The study finds that firms with high growth opportunity tends to issue less secured debt.
A few studies in REITs concern the usage of secured debt. Brown & Riddiough (1998) find that REITs with large amounts of properties could only or prefer to use secured debt financing, because unsecured debt financing would be more costly compared with equity. Ooi(2000) examines the incidence of secured debt among UK real estate companies. The author finds that secured debt are negatively correlated with firm size but positively related to firm's risk. Ambrose et al. (2010) test the relation between the utilization of secured debt and firm stock performance using the samples in REIT industry. They find the positive correlation between increased secured debt ratio and firm excess stock return in the following quarter. Also small and high leverage firms are more likely to increase the secured debt ratio.
To examine the relation between secured debt and managerial incentive through compensation structure, it is crucial to find out the correlation between firm's risk preference and secured debt. When managerial incentives are aligned with shareholders' interests and preferences by equity-based compensation, firm's risk preferences would be revealed through compensation incentives.
The influence of firm risk preference on secured debt falls into two aspects. One is that secured debt issuing is negatively related to firm's risk preference, which means that firms are inclined to issue less secured debt to reserve their flexibility when they have risk-taking preference whereas firms with low risk preference tend to pursue safe financing policy such as the utilization of more secured debt. The rationale is that if firms have alternative financing choices with less restrictive convents compared to secured debt, even associated with higher cost of debt, firms would probably prefer not to use secured debt, since they are probably willing to take the chance when they prefer risky policy and also have confidence in the return of new project. Therefore, secured debt ratio could inversely relate to firm's risk preference.
The other potential relation is that secured debt issuing is positively associated with firm's risk preference. This relation has two explanations. First is that if firms tend to take more risk, they could increase the amount of secured debt to reserve more cash flow with lower cost of debt, as suggested by Berkovitch & Kim (1990) . Therefore, firms with high risk preference would like to use more secured debt 2 and this policy would be welcomed by shareholders.
Second explanation is that firms with risky appetites are more likely to take risky projects, the potential agency cost between creditors and shareholders would be intensified, so firms probably consider more attractive financing policy, such as to use more collaterals to compensate creditors. Through this behavior, the asset substitution problem associated with increased agency cost between creditors and shareholders can be reduced. If this explanation holds, creditors would derive benefit from this financial policy eventually.
Therefore the utilization of more secured debt could rise when firms are willing to take more risk. But there still remains the question which explanation dominates the positive relation between secured debt ratio and firms' risk appetites. Therefore, based on above analysis, we develop the following hypotheses.
B. Hypotheses
B.1 Vega and Secured debt
There are three hypotheses with respect to the influence of Vega on secured debt ratio.
H1 Risky financing hypothesis
Jensen & Meckling (1976) argues that firms could align managers' interest with shareholders by enhancing managerial incentives using equity-based compensation.
Coles et al. (2006) suggest that corporate polices, such as the risk of investment and financing policies increases in managerial wealth sensitivity to stock return volatility (Vega). Therefore, firms with higher Vega are inclined to make more risky investment with more aggressive debt policies with higher flexibility and fewer collaterals.
Consequently, firms would decrease secured debt ratio and keep secured debt as a small proportion of total debt for firms with larger Vega. Thus, this hypothesis suggests:
H1: Secured debt ratio is negatively correlated with managerial wealth sensitivity to stock return volatility (Vega).
On the other hand, secured debt ratio could be positively associated with risk-taking incentive (Vega). But two different explanations could attribute to this relation. They are named as "Free cash flow hypothesis" and "Contracting cost hypothesis".
H2: Free cash flow hypothesis
Increasing secured debt could reduce the underinvestment problem, but with increasing free cash flow due to the lower cost of debt, firms may not only finance the value-increasing and risk-reducing projects, but also the risky projects (Leeth & Scott, 1989; Berkovitch & Kim, 1990) . If executives have risk-taking incentives which is aligned with shareholder's benefits and presents the risk preference of firms, firms with high risk-taking incentives would prefer more secured debt to make risky investment. Secured debt ratio will be positively correlated with managerial risk-taking incentive. Thus, this hypothesis suggests that secured debt ratio increases in managerial wealth sensitivity to stock return volatility (Vega).
H3: Contracting cost hypothesis
If managers' equity based compensation is preferred and used by shareholders to mitigate the agency cost between managers and shareholders, the activities induced by managerial incentives could enlarge the agency cost between shareholders and creditors (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Brockman et al., 2010; Billett et al., 2010) . If creditors detect the potential risk induced by managerial incentives associated with equity based compensation, they probably require more to protect themselves. Bond convents with senior claims such as debt with pledged assets should be a better way to restrict agency cost, such as asset substitution problem. On the other hand, firms may have to compensate the creditors by increasing debt with senior claims, such as secured debt to attenuate agency cost between shareholders and bondholders. In this case, secured debt ratio is also predicted to positively correlate with managerial wealth sensitivity Vega.
H2&H3: Secured debt ratio is positively correlated with managerial wealth sensitivity to stock return volatility (Vega)
Although H2 and H3 both have the same conclusion on how secured debt ratio correlates with managerial incentive (Vega), we could distinguish them with further test. That is to examine how the excess stock return responses to the change of secured debt ratio associated with managerial compensation incentive. If the "Free cash flow hypothesis" holds, shareholders would benefit from the change of secured debt ratio associated with managers' incentives, because increased free cash flow raised by less costly secured debt will provide firms with more flexibility on project financing. On the other hand, if the "Contracting cost hypothesis" holds, shareholder
would not favor the change of secured debt ratio correlated with managers' incentives, since the enlarged agency problem between shareholders and bondholders would increase the cost of debt at expense of shareholders' wealth.
B.2 Delta and Secured debt
Although the stock price sensitivity (Delta) and stock return volatility sensitivity (Vega) are both derived from stock and option and tend to be highly correlated, they are distinct sensitivity measures and may have different economic implications for policy choices. Thus, we have to control Delta to evaluate the robustness of our findings of Vega on secured debt ratio. To construct the excess return sample, we compute the annual change of secured debt ratio and excess stock return. Excess stock return is based on the difference between firm's stock return over year t-1 to year t using CRSP monthly return. The final sample contains 297 firm-year observations from the fiscal years 2001 to 2009.
B. Variable Descriptions
B.1 Dependent Variables: Secured debt ratio & Excess return
To isolate debt security decision from leverage decision, we normalize the amount of secured debt by its total debt. We measure the annual secured debt ratio and change in the secured debt ratio as:
Secured debt ratio t =Secured debt t / Total debt t ∆Secured debt ratio=Secured debt ratio t -Secured debt ratio t-1
Following the methodology in Faulkender & Wang (2006), excess return is the difference between firm's stock return over year t-1 to year t, and constructed REIT size and book-to-market matched portfolio return from year t-1 to year t.
REIT size and book-to-market portfolios are constructed following the Fama and French (1993,1995) , in each year, we divide all observations into four groups based on their sizes, the bottom 25% (small), 25%-50% (less small), 50%-75% (less big), above 75% (big), then we break each group into two subgroups based on their market-to-book-ratio, above median (high), below median (low). Therefore in each year we have eight groups according to the interaction between size and market-to-book sorts. Then we can compute the mean return of each group in every year to obtain the benchmark returns. Next we match every firm in my sample into one of the eight size and market-to-book portfolios. Finally, the excess return of each firm is the difference between firm's stock return over year t-1 to year t, and benchmark return of matched REIT portfolio from year t-1 to year t. 
B.4 Instrument Variables
We use some instruments for Vega and Delta in some of the regression models. The instruments include firm age, CEO age, and CEO tenure and CEO cash compensation ratio. Firm age in a given sample year is the number of years since the first year that the firm is reported in COMPUSTAT. CEO age is the age of CEO reported in ExecuComp database and CEO tenure is the number of years that current CEO has served in that capacity as reported in ExecuComp database. Cash compensation ratio is sum of CEO salary and bonus scaled by total compensation. These instruments for
Vega and Delta are also used by Coles et al. (2006) and Brockman et al. (2010).
Appendix A provides more descriptions for these instruments. as secured debt ratio. As described in our hypothesis development section, a increase in Vega increases the CEO's risk appetite. And we can see the same trend for both secured debt ratio and Vega. In contrary, the fluctuation of LNDELTA and leverage is shown over our sample period.
C. Sample Distribution and Summary Statistics
In Table 2 In Table 3 , we show the correlation between Secured debt ratio, LNDELTA, LNVEGA and other firm characteristics. And we can see that LNDELTA and LNVEGA are significantly correlated with coefficient of 0.7736. Thus, it is crucial to control LNDELTA when we consider the effect of LNVEGA on our dependent variables.
IV. Estimation Methods and Empirical Results
A. Secured Debt Ratio and CEO Managerial Incentives
A.1 Random Effect Analysis
We estimate the following panel data regression of Secured debt ratio on executive compensation incentives:
SECURED DEBT RATIO i,t = α 0 + α 1 LNDELTA i,t + α 2 LNVEGA i,t + α 3 LSIZE i,t +α 8 MTB i,t + α 5 LEVERAGE i,t + α 11 ABNEARN i,t + α 12 ST3 i,t + α 13 ZSCORE i,t + α 14 RATING i,t + ε i,t , (1)
Random effect is a better estimation compared with fixed effect. Hausman test is conducted to make sure that the random effect estimation is consistent and efficient.
In Table 4 , the results of the results from Equation (1) Besides the main variable of interest, LNVEGA, this regression also yields the consistent results for control variables. Most of the control variables are statistically significant and display the expected sign similar to previous studies (Leeth & Scott, 1989; Barclay & Smith, 1995; Ooi, 2001 ).
Firm size is a key variable in explanation of secured debt ratio. Specifically, small firms are more likely to use secured debt. Several studies have demonstrated this relation (Barclay & Smith, 1995b; Ooi, 2001) . The main reason is that small firms have fewer options but to issue secured debt whereas large firms have more choices of finance instruments. Following Barclay and Smith (1995) and others, we use the market value of the firm as a measure of firm size. Similar to Barclay and Smith (1995) , we found the significant negative relation between LNSIZE and secured debt ratio.
Abnormal earning is used to proxy the quality of firm (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Stohs & Mauer, 1996) . Good quality firms probably provide more secured debt to signal the credit worthiness to the lenders when lenders have less information about borrowers (Chan & Thakor, 1987; Igawa & Kanatas, 1990) . Also, with less probability of default, firms could enjoy high interest rate benefits with lower expected loss of collaterals. So secured debt offering is more valuable for high quality firm than low quality firms.
Following Barclay & Smith (1995) , good quality firms are more likely to have high positive abnormal return. Therefore, the positive relation is expected between abnormal earning and secured debt ratio.
Debt maturity is a significant variable in this regression since longer debt maturity increases the value of secured debt. When firms have longer maturities, they have more chances to substitute the less risky projects with the risky ones (Diamond, 1993) .
This would jeopardize creditors' benefits and increase the default risk. Also firms with long-term debt are also more likely to reject positive NPV projects since they have more opportunities to exercise the investment options (Myers, 1977) . So the value of secured debt will increase in debt maturity. The negative relation between secured debt ratio and short-term debt ratio confirms is expected.
MTB is expected to be inversely related to secured debt ratio. Previous research (such as Barclay & Smith, 1995) , indicates firms with more growth opportunities tend to obtain fewer secured debt. Our result is consistent with the literature but insignificant.
Leverage is certainly an important factor regarding debt structure and debt security policy. The positive coefficient can be interpreted that the default possibility increases in leverage ratio, so the value of secured debt will increase, and hence it will benefit firm to issue more secured debt (Stulz & Johnson, 1985) .
Zscore exhibits a negative coefficient which is consistent with prediction. Zscore evaluates the financial health of firms, good quality firms with high scores of Zscore will tend to use less secured debt when they have other options and more flexibility.
Rating also inversely correlates with secured debt ratio. As suggested by Leeth & Scott (1989) , secured debt value increases in probability of default. Firms with lower the credit rating tend to have higher the probability of bankruptcy. Thus, credit rating decreases in secured debt ratio. That means firms would like to utilize more secured debt when they have lower credit rating.
A.2 Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) Estimation
Model 3 in Table 5 helps to alleviate the endogeneity concern using two-stage-least squares estimation. In the first stage, we regress LNVEGA on all of the control variables used in Table 5 plus CEO cash compensation ratio (cash compensation/total compensation) and firm age. For LNDELTA, we use all the control variables in Table   5 along with CEO age and tenure. Model 3 reports the results where LNVEGA and LNDELTA are replaced by their predicted value from first stage regressions. As seen in 
We estimate the change-in-variable regression, as opposed to variable levels, to investigate the robustness of first regression. Taking first differences reduces the sample size from 360 to 295 observations. In Table 6 , the results of Model 5 are consistent with Model 1-4, showing positive and significant coefficient (0.0273).
Other independent variables show the similar coefficients as in the previous regressions. Overall, these change-in-variables results confirm the earlier findings based on variable levels.
B. Wealth effect of Secured Debt and CEO Managerial Incentives
So far the positive relation between secured debt ratio and CEO risk-taking incentive is confirmed to be consistent with "Free cash flow hypothesis" and "Contracting cost hypothesis", but it is still unclear which hypothesis dominants the relation. H2 argues that risk-taking incentive would encourage firm to use more secured debt to obtain more cash flow for external financing. While, H3 indicates that risk-taking incentive would induce more secured debt to alleviate the agency cost between shareholders and creditors which is increased for the large risk-taking compensation incentive.
To distinguish between the two hypotheses to have a better understanding of what drives the positive relation between LNVEGA and secured debt ratio, we examine the wealth effect of secured debt ratio change, and in particular, the influence of CEO compensation incentives on wealth effect of secured debt ratio change to shareholders.
"Free cash flow hypothesis" predicts the positive relation between wealth effect of secured debt ratio change and executive risk-taking incentive (LNVEGA), because secured debt ratio change benefits shareholders. Alternatively, "Cost contracting hypothesis" implies that value of secured debt ratio change decreases in LNVEGA.
By using the methodology of Faulkender & Wang (2006) 
In Equation (3), the dependent variable is excess return, which is the difference between firm i's stock return over year t-1 to year t ‫ݎ(‬ ,௧ ) and matched constructed REITs size and market-to-book portfolio return from t-1 to year t (ܴ ,௧ ).
The coefficients on the incentive variables(α 7 and α 8 ) measure the direct effect of compensation incentives on excess returns, and the coefficients on the interactions of the incentive variables with the change of secured debt ratio (α 5 and α 6 ) measure the effect of compensation incentives on wealth effect of secured debt ratio change. The coefficient of interest is α 6 (coefficient on LNVEGA×∆SECURED DEBT RATIO i,t. ), which measures the effect of CEO risk-taking incentive on wealth effect of secured debt ratio change. "Free cash flow hypothesis" predicts a positive α 6, whereas "Contracting cost hypothesis" indicates a negative α 6 , because the secured debt ratio increase is more likely to benefit creditors to mitigate the enlarged agency cost between shareholders and creditors for managerial risk-increasing incentive. Besides the key variables, we also find that Price to FFO ratio has the positive and significant coefficient, which suggests that firms with higher Price to FFO ratio tend to have more growth opportunities and better market performance.
V. Conclusion
This study focuses on the correlation between secured debt and managerial risk-taking incentive. A few findings need to be emphasized. First is the positive relation between secured debt and managerial risk-taking incentive (LNVEGA). This relation is confirmed by several robustness tests. This relation indicates that secured debt ratio is affected by executive compensation and increases in managerial risk-taking incentive.
Second, we posit that this positive relation can be explained in two possible ways. is the normal density function. 
